This paper assesses whether the most important R&D technologies at the roots of second-generation Schumpeterian growth theories are consistent with patenting and innovation statistics. Using US manufacturing industry data, we estimate various systems of simultaneous equations modeling the innovation functions underlying growth frameworks based on variety expansion, diminishing technological opportunities and rent protection activities. Our evidence indicates that innovation functions characterized by the increasing difficulty of R&D activity fit US data better. This finding relaunches the debate on the soundness of the new Schumpeterian strand of endogenous growth literature.
Introduction
The critique formulated by Jones (1995a Jones ( , 1995b , against the prediction of first-generation Schumpeterian growth models that productivity growth increases in the level of R&D resources (Figure 1) , marked a change in the development of the endogenous growth theory. On a theoretical ground, alternative mechanisms have been suggested to eliminate what is known as the scale effect of R&D activity. On an empirical ground, the soundness of such theories has been assessed estimating one common reduced form of research technology using US industry or cross-country data; however, these studies do not offer adequate insights on some crucial issues of the underlying theories, i.e., how innovation process is exactly designed, its key forces, and consistency with R&D and patenting statistics. The present paper fills this lack by examining whether the innovation functions underlying the most important Schumpeterian growth theories are consistent with the real world of business research. Although this issue has been remained almost unexplored, it appears indispensable to both identify the most credible growth theory and help policy-makers tailor the most appropriate measures to promote economic development.
With the aim of removing the scale effect, a first body of theoretical studies emphasizes that R&D spreads thinly across product varieties as the economy grows (Aghion and Howitt, 1998 , Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1998 , Peretto, 1998 Howitt, 1999 and Young, 1998 . Due to population growth, product varieties have to be expanded in order to satisfy consumer demand. This can be achieved by raising the volume of R&D resources, so to make research input per inhabitant stable over time. Along the steady-state growth path, the aggregate growth rate depends, among other things, on the R&D subsidy/tax rate. In the light of such properties, these are usually referred to as fully-endogenous, scale-invariant or permanent effects on growth models. A second direction has been explored by Jones (1995a) , Kortum (1997) and Segerstrom (1998) , who point out that a feature of modern innovation is the exhaustion of technological opportunities, which raises the difficulty of conducting research. Increasing resources are necessary to maintain a constant rate of innovation and a sustained economic growth. In such a framework, R&D policies affect growth only along transitional dynamics: for this reason, they are usually defined as semi-endogenous, scale-invariant or temporary effects on growth models. Lastly, research focus has recently shifted to rent protection activities, which incumbents undertake to reduce the technological opportunities of R&D activity by outside firms (Dinopoulos and Syropoulos, 2007) . These activities consist of defensive patenting or expenses for specialized labor, lawyers and lobbyists, and are strategically aimed at lowering the probability for newcomers of introducing a frontier technology or a state-of-the-art product. Like the first strand of models, R&D policies can steadily fuel economic expansion in this set-up, and hence growth is fully endogenous.
As a result of competing views about the mechanism driving the growth process, several papers have assessed the soundness of the fully-endogenous growth models against semi-endogenous growth models. Using US manufacturing industry data, Zachariadis (2003) presents evidence in favor of the former theories. Research intensity is found to positively affect the rate of innovation, which in turn hastens technical progress. According to Laincz and Peretto (2006) , data on US employment, R&D personnel and production establishments support the idea that the scale effect is sterilized by product proliferation. Examining the US macroeconomic performance, Ha and Howitt (2007) consistently show that semi-endogenous growth models do not behave as well as fullyendogenous growth theories. A similar conclusion is drawn by Madsen (2008b) , ap-plying to international data an extended framework which controls for technological catch-up and international technology spillovers. 1 Conversely, Madsen (2007) detects a stationary relationship between patent counts (research output) and R&D expenditure (research input) across OECD countries; this indicates that R&D activity may be characterized by constant returns to scale, confuting the hypothesis of either exhausting technological opportunities or product proliferation. Evidence in favor of semiendogenous growth theory is sparse (Venturini, 2010 and, to some extent, Ang and Barcenilla-Visús et al., 2010) .
Using US manufacturing industry data for the period 1973-1996, this paper estimates various systems of simultaneous equations modeling the R&D technologies underlying the most important theories of Schumpeterian growth. Our evidence indicates that any growth framework has empirical foundations; however, the exhaustion of technological opportunities, which makes research less fertile over time, is the mechanism best matching the real dynamics of business innovation. The paper contributes to the literature in several respects. First, it directly looks into the black box of R&Dbased endogenous growth models, by comparing various innovation functions on an empirical ground. Second, it overcomes the typical dichotomy between fully-and semi-endogenous scale-invariant Schumpeterian models, presenting a regression analysis based upon a more structured theoretical background. Third, it privileges crosssectoral variation of data and focuses on the US, as most R&D-based growth theories are designed to describe innovation processes occurring at firm or industry level in a knowledge-based (frontier) economy. 2 Lastly, it is one of the first studies which joins patent quality statistics with traditional quantitative indicators of innovation output and research effort.
The outline of the work is as follows. Section 2 describes the analytical properties of the R&D technology at the basis of second-generation Schumpeterian growth theory. Section 3 develops the empirical set-up and illustrates the identification strategy. Section 4 describes innovation data for the US manufacturing sector. Section 5 presents the econometric results, and section 6 concludes.
R&D technology in Schumpeterian growth theory
Deliberate innovation activity, characterized by uncertain realization, is the milestone of R&D-based growth theory. The basic traits of R&D technology were originally developed by the first-generation Schumpeterian models of endogenous growth, following in the footsteps of the industrial organization literature on patent races (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Segerstrom et al., 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991, ch. 4) . Such races play out at an economy-wide or industry level; they are assumed to be stochastic, memoryless processes characterized by free-entry conditions and exogenous probabilities of innovation. Firms target their research efforts to improve existing products, and do not benefit from cumulating unsuccessful research efforts; for this reason, newcomers can compete with incumbents in developing the next state-of-the-art product. The winner takes over industry leadership and earns monopoly profits up to the invention of the next state-of-the-art product. The probability that an innovation occurs is assumed to be independently distributed across firms, industries, and over time. The 1 See also Zachariadis (2004) , Bottazzi and Peri (2007) , Ulku (2007a) and, in part, Ang and Madsen (2010) . Sedgley (2006) develops (and) tests a scale-invariant growth model allowing for transitional dynamics and complementarities between knowledge and human capital. 2 Aghion and Durleauf (2009, p. 22) 3 industry-wide rate of R&D success is defined as: 3
where ω denotes industries and t time. λ (> 0) is the Poisson (instantaneous) rate of arrival, and (ω, t) is the amount of specialized inputs devoted to R&D activities, typically labor (scientists and engineers) or research expenses. Since the most innovative ideas are patented, the rate of innovation is approximated by the rate of patenting. The innovation function in equation (1) may be viewed as a re-parametrization of an ideas production function of the following form (Ha and Howitt, 2007) :
wherei(·) is the annual flow of new ideas; i(·) the stock of ideas available each year. V t = L c t captures the effect of product proliferation associated with population growth, L t . c is the corresponding duplication parameter, ranging from 0 when all innovations are duplications, to 1 when there are no duplicating inventions. When a = b = 1 and c = 0, the expression fori(ω, t)/i(ω, t) boils down to equation (1) . By empirically assessing innovation function (2), many works have sought to check the general validity of models based on variety expansion (a = c = 1, b > 0) against those based on exhausting technological opportunities (a < 1, c = 0, b > 0).
Variety expansion (VE).
A first influential attempt to remove the scale effect from the endogenous growth framework is made by Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Howitt (1999) . Such models are based on a research technology in which the industry-wide probability of introducing a new state-of-the-art product is generated by the following two-equation process:
a(ω, t) a(ω, t) = σι(ω, t).
λ is the productivity parameter of R&D activities performed to improve product quality; n(ω, t) is defined as ratio between research inputs devoted by each sector to vertical innovation, r(ω, t), and available product varieties multiplied by the total-economy leading-edge productivity level, m(ω, t) and A(t). This type of correction is made to account for the forces of increasing complexity in production activities: the more product quality improvements, the more resource-intensive future technological advances. n(ω, t) may thus be thought as of a productivity-adjusted measure of research efforts. Another crucial insight of this framework is that, at an economywide level, leading-edge productivity, A(t), grows at the same rate of industry productivity a(ω, t), as ratio a it /A t converges monotonically to an invariant distribution, a(ω, t)/a(ω, t) =Ȧ(t)/A(t). The rise in the leading-edge productivity parameter, as well as in its industry counterparts, occurs as a result of the knowledge spillovers associated with R&D activities; the marginal impact of vertical innovation on knowledge stock is denoted by σ. This is the rationale behind equation (4) . The main virtue of this research technology is that of disentangling the effect of R&D activities on innovation output from that of innovation output on productivity, avoiding any mismeasurement due to the combination of knowledge and efficiency in Solow's residual .
Diminishing technological opportunities (DTO). The R&D technology proposed by Segerstrom (1998) departs from the previous formulation for the channel through which technological complexity is assumed to thwart the achievement of innovation. The rate of innovation is indeed hypothesized to be lowered by the difficulty associated with research activity, x(ω, t): researchers start off by pursuing the most promising projects and, if they fail, they try less promising projects. Higher values of x(ω, t) imply that research becomes less fertile: the same amount of R&D resources generates fewer inventions over time. To control for heterogeneity in innovation processes, Segerstrom (1998) assumes that the detrimental effect of research complexity is industry-specific; it contrasts with the formulation based on variety expansion shown above, where the rate of innovation is dampened by the frontier's productivity, which expands as a result of product proliferation. Moreover, in Segerstrom (1998) , the rate at which x(ω, t) increases depends itself on the rate of research success according to parameter µ (> 0). The R&D race of this model is thus governed by the two following equations:
where Z (> 0) is an exogenous productivity parameter common to all sectors. According to equation (6), the rate of realization of current research efforts enhances the difficulty of introducing a patentable innovation in subsequent periods. Li (2003) extends the previous innovation function in several respects. Two further explanatory factors of patenting are considered. First, he stresses the rise in innovation difficulty coming from past research successes. As products improve in quality and become more complex, the creation of the next state-of-the-art quality product becomes more difficult. The higher the quality of the state-of-the-art product, q(j ω , ω, t), the lower the rate of innovation ι(ω, t). Second, innovating may become less difficult over time, due to the possibility of positive cross-industry knowledge spillovers. The likelihood of research success is thus raised by the average quality of state-ofthe-art products, Q(t) = ω q(j ω , ω, t). ψ (> 0) is the corresponding parameter of externality. This kind of R&D race is investigated by following the formulation recently proposed by Minniti et al. (2008) , in which product quality is hypothesized to evolve with random jumps of different magnitude drawn from a Pareto distribution, ζ = q(j ω + 1, ω, t)/q(j ω , ω, t) > 1:
z (> 0) is a constant parameter.q(j ω , ω, t) = q(j ω + 1, ω, t) − q(j ω , ω, t) is the quality difference (or jump) between the state-of-the-art product and its predecessor (or fol-lower) in the quality ladder which annually emerges in any industry. ι(ω, t)q(j ω , ω, t) may be thought as a quality-adjusted measure of the probability of innovating; it derives from the definition of quality improvement as the expected value between a positive jumpq(j ω , ω, t) = (ζ − 1)q(j ω , ω, t) > 0, occurring with probability ι(ω, t), and the case of constant qualityq(j ω , ω, t) = 0, whose rate of realization is obviously 1−ι(ω, t). 4 ι(ω, t)q(j ω , ω, t) determines the extent of the quality jump associated with the new state-of-the-art product. Two important points on this innovation function are in order. First, it recognizes that knowledge spillovers originate from innovation quality, rather than from the amount of innovation output (patent counts) or, worse, of research inputs. Second, in comparison with the literature examining the relationship between innovation and productivity, equation (7) specifically identifies the channel through which firms (or industries) benefit from knowledge spillovers, i.e., a higher research fertility.
Rent protection activities (RPA). A mechanism alternative to the ones so far envisaged has been proposed by Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) . They identify in the rent-protection barriers that incumbent (innovating) firms erect to protect their positions the main impediment to the research of newcomers. RPA may involve excessive patenting, patent enforcement through litigation, practicing trade secrecy, lobbying the government to affect legislation, and corrupting the legal/political system. These activities enhance the difficulty which challengers face when entering an R&D race with the view of obtaining a new product (or technology). 5 Here, we employ the R&D technology proposed by Sener (2008) . It combines the effect of RPA as formulated by Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) with the baseline mechanism of DTO described above (see eqs. 5-6). This kind of R&D race assumes the following form:
Equation (10) closely corresponds to the rate of patenting devised by Segerstrom (1998) , whereas equation (11) describes the evolution of R&D difficulty as dependent on two distinct forces. The former is the typical effect associated with the realization of innovation described by equation (6). The latter is the impact of rent protection activities performed at industry level, p(ω, t), scaled on the current level of R&D difficulty. 6 η captures the effectiveness of RPA on research difficulty; this parameter may either be interpreted as a proxy of the extent to which existing institutions protect intellectual property, or as the (time-invariant) productivity level of incumbents' lobbying outlays. Clearly, when µ > 0 and η = 0, equation (11) boils down to the formulation of Segerstrom (1998) . Conversely, when η > 0 and µ = 0, equation (11) falls close to the RPA mechanism originally elaborated by Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) . The main discrepancy between the framework proposed by these authors and equation (11) is found in the assumption made on the nature of the rent-protection effect. R&D difficulty is modeled as a flow variable fully decaying at each instant in time in the original formulation, i.e., x(ω, t) = ηp(ω, t). By contrast, in equation (11) it is considered as a stock variable, to accommodate the possibility that RPA have persistent effects on the legislative and judicial system, or that the detrimental effects of R&D difficulty on technological advancements decrease slowly over time. As shown in an earlier version of this paper, the empirical counterpart of the system (10)-(11) outperforms the one originally conceived by Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) .
Empirical specification and identification strategy
In the regression analysis, we assess the empirical soundness of R&D races by estimating the discrete-time version of the equation systems introduced in the previous section.
To match notation with the standard practice of empirical literature, hereafter industries are indicated by i (in place of ω), and time and sectors are denoted as subscripts. The first point to be stressed is that log-linearization is implemented on the expression for the rate of innovation, ι. Any empirical specification is obtained from the theoretical counterpart by adding a deterministic part (fixed effects, time trends or time dummies). The equation for the rate of innovation, ι, includes both industry-specific intercepts, θ i , and heterogenous time trends ϑ i . θ i should capture the time-invariant industry characteristics of the process underlying the probability of obtaining a patentable invention; ϑ i should instead take the possible changes of the propensity to patent over time (Zachariadis, 2003, p. 580) . Unless specified otherwise, all the specifications where the dependent variable is expressed as a percentage rate of change, or in first differences, omit time-invariant sectoral effects but include common time dummies to control for the impact of temporary shocks, T D (R&D policies, business cycle, changes in regulative frameworks, etc.). 7 Serial correlation is controlled for by adding a 2nd-order autoregressive error to the equations expressed in log-levels ( it = ρ 1 t−1 + ρ 2 t−2 + ξ it ), and a 1st-order autoregressive error to those with dependent variables expressed as rate of change or first differences (ε it = ε it−1 + υ it ). We also include a set of control variables (C it ), to be introduced below, to assess the robustness of results. We start by examining the R&D race at the basis of the variety expansion framework (Aghion and Howitt's technology) considering a productivity-adjusted measure of R&D input, n it = r it /A t m it (Aghion and Howitt's technology, model A):
∆ln ait = β1ιit + βC Cit + εit.
According to theory, the predicted range of values for α 1 is [0, 1], and (0, +∞) for β 1 . α 1 = 0 indicates that innovations are targeted to product duplication only, and α 1 = 1 that they are truly novel . However, we also estimate a more general innovation function that does not impose parameter restrictions for R&D input r it , the frontier's productivity A t , and product varieties m it (Aghion and Howitt's technology, model B):
∆ln ait = β1ιit + βC Cit + εit,
α 1 , β 1 > 0, and α 2 , α 3 < 0. 8 This specification has the advantage that it can be estimated safely with annual observations in place of long-differences or cointegration 7 The appropriateness of the deterministic elements attached to each specification is confirmed by unreported F-test of significance.
8 Common temporal controls are omitted from the specifications for ∆ ln a it because of the procedure followed to build this technology indicator, which purges any systematic component from the dynamics of equations, typically used with steady-state growth specifications . Moreover, it better captures cross-sectional variation in the efforts made to generate new ideas as it rests upon level rather than intensity measures of research activity (Luintel and Khan, 2009) ; this issue will be discussed in-depth later.
Our exploration of the DTO framework first considers the baseline technology of research proposed by Segerstrom (1998) (Segerstrom's technology) :
where α 1 , β 1 > 0, and α 2 < 0. As a second step, we estimate the system of three equations developed by Li (2003) ; in this set-up, the engine of innovation is represented by the (stochastic) qualitative evolution of state-of-the-art products, ∆q, which is measured as the difference between the leader' s quality and that of the second most innovative product in the sectoral quality ladder (Li's technology):
where α 1 , α 2 , β 1 > 0, γ 1 > 1, and α 3 , α 4 < 0. 9 In assessing the RPA set-up, we consider the empirical counterpart of the R&D technology designed by Sener (2008) , as follows:
with α 1 , β 1 , β 2 > 0 and α 2 < 0. In this framework, the main complication comes from the lack of adequate proxies for industry efforts in lobbying. For this reason, the impact of RPA is subsumed by adopting variables which on both theoretical and empirical grounds are argued to affect lobbying activities, and hence may raise research difficulty indirectly (indirect identification). 10 A similar strategy is followed by Comin and Hobijn (2009) to capture the effect of lobbying on cross-country technology diffusion. Since the effectiveness of lobbying is inversely related to its costs, and as these are higher in the presence of certain institutional characteristics, we can infer whether lobbying slows down the uptake of new technologies by looking at the relation between institutional factors and technology diffusion. Comin and Hobijn (2009) find that this effect is negatively significant, and stronger when a new technology has a technologically close predecessor, or the degree of market competition is high. In the same vein, show that the threat of technologically advanced entry encourages innovation by incumbents near the technological frontier. Accordingly, we hypothesize the variable . a it is constructed as TFP growth net of the impact of non-technological effects (non-constant returns and imperfect competition, aggregation effects, varying utilization of capital and labor). 9 The Pareto distribution, from which the theoretical parameter ζ (= γ 1 ) is assumed to be drawn, may not have finite moments, and this condition may inhibit the use of traditional estimation techniques (Silverberg and Verspagen, 2007) . However, the results of the current analysis do not depend on such distributional properties as holding for whatever type of distribution is imposed for ζ. For our purposes, a necessary condition to observe an improvement in the state-of-the-art products' quality is that ζ be greater than one (γ 1 > 1).
10 This amounts to assumingẋ/x = g p(u 1 , u 2 , ...) , with g p · > 0 and p u j (·) > 0, where u j is an indirect indicator of RPA. In an earlier version of the work, we showed that the RPA impact cannot be identified through such direct measures as claimed priorities, blocking patents and total patent counts. a relationship among the extent of technological market competition, product contiguity (denoted by h and c), and the RPA of the following form:
In so doing, we keep the regression analysis as simple as possible by forcing factor elasticities ϕ and ς to take only two values, zero or one. This implies that three forms of indirect impact are admitted as regards research difficulty: 1) the impact of market concentration only (ϕ = 1, ς = 0); 2) the impact of the technological closeness of competing products only (ϕ = 0, ς = 1); and 3) a joint effect of both factors (ϕ = ς = 1). This formulation admits the joint effect even when factors do not affect individually the dynamics of R&D difficulty.
In order to check the robustness of estimates, we consider numerous additional variables that might be shaping innovation performance (C). To exclude the possibility that technological laggards innovate more because they benefit from imitation, we include the distance to the innovation frontier (Acemoglu et al., 2006) ; it is given by the ratio between the frontier and the industry value of research productivity, measured by the number of patent counts per real dollar spent on R&D. The sum of imports and exports over gross output is adopted to assess the benefits related to the trade openness of the sector (larger markets, cheaper inputs, induced changes in specialization; see Bloom et al., 2010) . We nonetheless consider the specific role of international technology spillovers by including the imports-weighted R&D capital of OECD partner industries; this is typically used to test whether knowledge diffuses across countries through the channel of trade (Coe and Helpman, 1995) . As Aghion et al. (2005) point out, the degree of market power is another crucial characteristic that may shape innovation performance; for this reason, the profits-output ratio is introduced into the regression. According to Peretto (2007) , firms more intensively take up innovation to find new growth opportunities when are subject to a heavier taxation; as a consequence, we also consider a proxy for the fiscal burden, defined as taxes on production and imports over gross output. The output share of skilled labour is instead introduced to circumvent the risk that estimates of theoretical parameters are plagued by the omission of human capital, given that high-tech industries employ more educated workers (Jorgenson et al., 2005) . The ratio between interests paid on loans and investment expenditure should instead identify the role of financial development. Structurally, R&D-intensive industries need more external funds which, however, are not always able to obtain because of a large share of intangible assets, difficult to collateralize. Due to this mismatch, financially developed industries are likely to be more prolific in patenting (Ilyina and Samaniego, 2010) . Finally, the ratio between investment and capital service expenditure is used to filter out the effect of transitional dynamics; indeed, laggards may innovate at faster rates as they are at a lower stage of economic development, rather than for higher technological opportunities. Full details on control variables are given in the Appendix.
Data description 4.1 Sources and methodology
The analysis is performed on a panel of twelve US manufacturing industries: 1) Food, kindred products & tobacco; 2) Chemicals & allied products; 3) Petroleum, refining & extraction; 4) Rubber products & plastics; 5) Stone, clay & glass; 6) Primary metals; 7) Fabricated metal products; 8) Machinery, NEC; 9) Electrical equipment; 10) Transport equipment; 11) Professional & scientific instruments; 12) Others. The pe-riod covered spans from 1973 to 1996, that is the last year for which consistent series on patenting, R&D and productivity are available (see the Appendix for details). As in Zachariadis (2003) , the rate of innovation, ι, is defined as the ratio between the number of patent counts (ideas) applied each year and the stock of patented ideas (knowledge) accumulated up to that year. Industry stocks of patented innovations are obtained from patent counts through the perpetual inventory method and geometrical depreciation (or obsolescence); unless otherwise specified, a standard decay rate of 15% is applied (δ = 0.15). Patent data come from NBER USPTO database.
Research input is gauged by R&D employment (r it and it ), i.e. full-time equivalent R&D scientists and engineers (source: National Science Foundation). As in Madsen (2008a), the productivity-adjusted measure of R&D engagement n it = r it /A t m it uses total full-time equivalent employment as a proxy for variety expansion (m it e it ): in most Schumpeterian growth models, the number of products is equal to the size of the population, and this ultimately determines occupational levels. Alternative proxies for m it are real output, patent stocks and the interaction between the latter variable with employment (respectively indicated by y it , k it and k it · e it ). A t is defined as the maximum value across industries of the pure technology index developed by Basu et al. (2006) , taken as deviation from the mean of manufacturing.
The degree of R&D difficulty, x, is the crucial force removing the scale effect from the DTO growth framework. We propose to measure x with the ratio between R&D expenses and gross output (taken at current prices). This choice follows Luintel and Khan (2009) , who argue that the effort in generating new ideas is better captured by level rather than intensity measures of research input. The latter indicators are suited for revealing the 'congestion' of ideas production when increasingly larger resources are devoted to developing new goods or production techniques. Indeed, since its origins, patent literature has shown that innovation outcomes are related to the volume of R&D resources, not to their intensity (Wilson, 2002, p. 291) . Moreover, by measuring R&D difficulty with the research expenses-output ratio, equation (19) is consistent with the findings of Ngai and Samaniego (2010) on the dominant role played by diminishing returns to scale of innovation in explaining cross-industry differentials in R&D intensity. Evidence on Schumpeterian growth theory where indicators of R&D intensity are negatively related to patenting or productivity performance can be found in Ulku (2007a Ulku ( , 2007b , Barcenilla-Visús et al. (2010) , Madsen (2008a) , among others.
Innovation quality is primarily measured by patent forward citations, adjusted for the effect of truncation (Hall et al., 2001) ; alternatively, we also employ backward citations, claims, and a common quality factor extracted from these indicators (Hall et al., 2007) . Claims specify the building blocks (components) of an innovation over which the inventor asks for legal protection; their number is indicative of the extent of innovation. Citations reflect previously existing knowledge upon which new patents build. Backward citations are those made to existing patents. Forward citations are those received by a patent from the application or grant date. The rationale for using citations is that the more frequently a patent is cited, the larger its effect on the creation of further innovation. However, according to Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) , these measures convey different pieces of information on the quality of a patented innovation, and it may be more appropriate to extract a synthetic indicator from them, in order to gain as much information as possible. For each of these indicators, q it is defined as the maximum value shown by a patent applied at year t in sector i. The manufacturing mean of any quality indicator is used as a proxy for the cross-industry knowledge spillover, Q t .
As an indirect proxy of rent protection, a concentration indicator of technological activity is constructed with patent citations. There is reason to believe that more ef-fective barriers to prevent further entries in the sector are erected if the concentration is relatively high. Hence, for each individual application, we first compute a normalized Herfindahl index of the citations received, distinguished by the origin sector of the citing patent, and then take the average value of this indicator at industry level. This measure reveals the technological strength of a patent within the sector: the more concentrated the citations, the less pervasive the underlying technology across industries, and the higher the market power of patent assignee. Lastly, in order to gauge the technological closeness between the product leader and its close follower, we take the inverse of the quality jump between (adjusted) forward citations. This indicator approaches zero when the distance between the first two most frequently cited patents is indefinitely large, and grows with the rise of product similarity. Table 1 lists mean values of the explanatory variables. Between 1973 and 1996, the probability of patenting, ι, was of 16.9% in the US manufacturing sector. Productivityadjusted R&D input, n, measured by R&D scientists and engineers over the product between the frontier's TFP and labor force, amounted to 3.1. If we look at the level of research engagement, (r and ), it is possible to see that 41,800 specialized workers were on average employed in US research laboratories, rising from 30,000 in the early 1970s to over 50,000 in the mid-1990s. On the other hand, the intensity of R&D expenditure on gross output, which is our key measure of research difficulty (x), was of 2.8%. The dynamics of this variable reveals that the difficulty of conducting research rose at an annual rate of 0.4%, ∆ ln x. 11 Table 1 about here Focusing on technological performance in final production (a and A), it emerges that the productivity index grew by 0.8%. The relative level of the economy-wide, leading-edge technology, A t , assumes a value of 1.17, indicating that the technical frontier of the most advanced industry lied approximately one-fifth above the manufacturing mean. The quality of state-of-the-art products is inferred through the patent quality statistics, q. The maximum number of (un-adjusted) forward citations was 168, which is a value 20 times higher than sectoral mean citations (see series adjusted for truncation). The corresponding values of backward citations and claims are lower, respectively 114 and 139, for the common quality factor 2.5. Qualitative advances of frontier products were particularly erratic and heterogenous (∆q); on average, quality jump ranged from 42.9 for unadjusted forward citations (5.2 for adjusted series) to 0.33 for the common quality index. According to the indirect proxies of RPA, the degree of concentration was of 51% (i.e. half the citations received by a patent came from its own sector); the indicator of technological contiguity between the two first state-of-the-art products in the industry quality ladder was slightly higher than one (1.04).
Descriptive statistics

Empirical Results
Variety expansion (VE)
The regression analysis is performed with the estimator of three-stage least squares. For each specification, we report the Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, and the panel stationarity test robust to cross-sectional dependence of Hadri and Kurozumi (2009) , applied to the residuals of each system equation. 12 Acceptance of the null hypothesis by the former statistics ensures that the instruments employed are sufficiently informative for parameter identification; in contrast, by failing to reject the null hypothesis, the latter test guarantees that our empirical model suitably describes an equilibrium (stationary) relationship. We begin by assessing the set-up developed by Aghion and Howitt (1998, model A) . The baseline regression is characterized by particularly low explanatory power, as all the stochastic regressors are not significant (column 1, Table 2 ). The insignificance of the productivity-adjusted research input, n, is compatible with the possibility that innovation fuels product duplication. However, it may also be that our estimates are plagued by the bias induced by the assumptions underlying the empirical framework. Therefore, we first assess the robustness of the results to the rate at which ideas are assumed to become obsolete (δ). This assumption determines the value of patent stocks, influencing the dynamics of the patenting rate; the related bias may reverberate through the system equations and undermine the consistency of estimates. The rate at which ideas depreciate reflects the creative destruction exerted by current innovation on older ideas (Caballero and Jaffe, 1993) . As alternative values for δ, we adopt rates of 7 and 30%. The former is the average value over time estimated by the above authors using US patent citation data; the latter is adopted to control for the large cross-sectional variation they found in estimating the effect of creative destruction. 13 Hall (2010) extrapolates knowledge depreciation from estimates of R&D returns, finding for US manufacturing firms rates that range from below zero to 28 per cent, depending on the extrapolation method used.
By using a rate of 7% we find a negative effect of productivity-adjusted R&D input, n, on the achievement of innovation (col. 2), which is incompatible with any theoretical prediction. By imposing an annual decay of 30%, the results somewhat improve, as n is found to positively affect the rate of innovation (0.200); this finding is consistent with 12 All the estimates of the paper are obtained using as instruments from two-to four-year lagged values of the right-hand side (endogenous) variables, as well as the deterministic elements of the empirical model. The key results are confirmed by adopting the two-stage least squares estimator (the difference between 2SLS and 3SLS results is checked by a Hausman test) or weighting observations with industry size (approximated by patent counts, R&D expenditure or gross output, taken in logs). The panel stationarity test adopts a AR (1) specification; the method proposed by Sul et al. (2005) is used to build the long-run variance. 13 The choice of the obsolescence parameter mirrors two opposite forces characterizing innovation, the socalled standing-on-shoulders effect and the fishing-out effect. On one hand, ideas flow freely across space and time, and contribute to the endowment of knowledge used for creating new ideas (δ low). On the other hand, patented ideas are continually displaced by new technological advances, suggesting a rapid decay for knowledge (δ high). If no obsolescence is assumed, older ideas fully concur to the creation of the current knowledge stock and, hence, to new inventions (δ = 0); in this case, the standing-on-shoulders effect is dominant. Instead, assuming full decay nullifies the contribution of current ideas to the next technological advance (δ = 1), thus maximizing the fishing-out effect. A given amount of technological knowledge reduces to less than one percentage of its initial level after 64 years from its introduction when it depreciates at an annual rate of 7%, after 29 years decaying at a 15% rate, and 14 years at 30%. Zachariadis (2003) and Ulku (2007a) . Conversely, in each specification, the patenting rate is far from being significant in explaining the industry technical change, ∆ ln a it . To understand whether this result is driven by the nature of technology indicator used (col. 4), we re-estimate the model using output per worker as a productivity measure, but the explanatory variable of the second equation remains ineffective. Therefore, the assessment of the R&D technology based on variety expansion proceeds considering an innovation framework where technological knowledge depreciates rapidly (30% per year). 14 In columns (5) through (7), we adopt alternative adjustment factors for R&D effort, based on variables that more directly approximate innovation (or production) output; in this case, correction for product proliferation omits the effect of the frontier's productivity, A = 1 (Madsen, 2008a) . When patent stock is used as a proxy for product varieties (m k), we have a common normalization for the dependent variable (patent counts) and the explanatory variable (research input), yielding a smaller coefficient for adjusted R&D input (0.078). The fall in parameter size is even more pronounced if the adjustment factor is given by the interaction between patent stock and employment (0.043, m k · e), whilst it is modest when we use real output (0.072, m y).
The right-hand side of Table ( 2) reports estimates including control variables. We first introduce the distance to frontier; in the patenting equation, we consider how far an industry is from the innovation frontier, in the TFP growth equation how far it is from the productivity frontier. In column (8), the adjusted R&D input is ineffective in enhancing the rate of innovation, whilst the positive coefficient of the control variable signals a significant convergence in patenting rates between laggards and leaders (0.208); taken together, it means that imitation is the prevailing force of innovation . The impact of R&D effort on patenting is always identified in the following regressions, expect when we control for financial development (col. 14) .
Notice that the empirical model meets all the theoretical predictions when it includes controls for the fiscal burden or the endowment of human capital (cols. 12 and 13). The coefficient of tax rate is positive in both equations of regression (12), indicating that firms might rely more upon innovation when taxation is high in order to gain extensive margins, and this then translates into a faster growth of productivity. Moreover, the outward orientation is associated with a higher innovation capacity (0.480, col. 9); however, this effect is unrelated to international technology spillovers as foreign R&D capital has a negative impact on patenting (-0.275, col 10). The latter finding is consistent with the view that the US are a net loser in terms of technology transfers (Luintel and Khan, 2004) . The irrelevance of transitional dynamics in both system equations might instead reflect the limited time span of data, which inhibits a proper identification of the effect of this variable. 15 Table 3 about here In Table (3) we re-assess the R&D race designed by Aghion and Howitt (1998) separating the effect of R&D input, r it , from those of the frontier's productivity and product varieties, A t and m it (model B). In column (1) we use a standard rate of depreciation of 15%, finding that the probability of introducing a new (patentable) idea is unrelated to R&D effort. Leading-edge productivity plays instead a detrimental role, as probably raising the cost of further technological advances (-2.545) ; in contrast to expectations, our proxy for product proliferation is positively associated with innovation outcomes (0.740). From the second equation, again it can be observed the inconsistency of innovation arrival for productivity growth. These findings are reaffirmed assuming a slower depreciation for patented ideas (7%, col. 2), but not in the presence of a rapid obsolescence when estimates correctly reflect the theoretical predictions, except for the positive effect of the labour force (30%, col. 3). Less satisfactory results are obtained using either output per worker as a productivity measure or alternative indicators of product varieties; in the former regression, productivity growth and patenting are confirmed to be unrelated (col. 4); in the latter, inference is plagued by the particularly low power of instruments (Hansen-Sargan test p-value<0.10 in cols. 5-7).
In robustness checks, R&D input is not significant if we consider the distance to frontier or the labour share of skilled workers employed in the industry (cols. 8 and 13). It is worth noting that the arrival rate of innovation is found to drive productivity growth in most regressions. A relevant exception is the specification allowing for transitional dynamics (col. 15). As in Ang and Madsen (2010) , the development stage towards the steady-state appears to matter for productivity growth (first equation), where this factor prevails over the effect of patenting, but it is ineffective in explaining industry differentials in innovation outcomes (second equation). Overall, regressions (8) through (15) suggest that TFP growth equation may be misspecified, and a larger array of determinants should be taken into account, both theoretically and empirically.
Diminishing technological opportunities (DTO)
Estimation results of the R&D race devised by Segerstrom (1998) are reported in Table (4) . As the baseline specification shows (col. 1, δ = 0.15), this type of R&D technology appears empirically grounded: the probability of success for a typical firm engaging in an R&D race, ι, rises with the volume of research resources but decreases with R&D difficulty, and x. The effect of the latter factor prevails over the positive one of R&D employment (-0.258 against 0.157): it implies that firms need increasingly larger volumes of R&D input to maintain innovation output constant over time. This effect is reinforced by the increasing returns of patenting on the dynamics of innovation difficulty, ∆ ln x: a 1% increase in the rate of patenting speeds up the growth in research intensity by over 1.2% (significant at a 10% level), supporting the view advanced by Segerstrom (1998) that innovating is progressively harder and more complex. As regression (2) shows, the baseline results do not find support assuming relatively slow obsolescence for patented ideas: when a depreciation rate of 7% is imposed neither the effect of R&D employment on the arrival rate of innovation, nor that of patenting on the change of R&D difficulty are identified. Corroborative evidence is apparently obtained by imposing a rapid rate of depreciation (30%, col. 3); however, this inference is compromised by the scarce information of the employed set of instruments (Hansen-Sargan test p-value=0.05). Therefore, robustness checks are conducted in the following using a standard rate of knowledge depreciation (15%).
One of the main motivations behind the removal of the scale effect from the Schumpeterian growth set-up is that, over the long run, TFP growth is stationary despite the upsurge in R&D resources. As discussed above, this fact is explained by the rising complexity of innovation. How innovation difficulty is measured is then crucial in assessing this innovation function. As an alternative to R&D intensity, regression (4) uses the amount of R&D expenses per each patent count (i.e. the inverse of research productivity). However, in our sample, this indicator is characterized by large cross-sectional variation, which inhibits identification of the effect of patenting on the dynamics of R&D difficulty.
By and large, the baseline DTO framework is validated by the regressions including control variables (cols. 5-12). The rate of patenting is higher for industries far from the innovation frontier (0.252), those more prone to international trade (0.227), gaining higher profit rates (0.040), which are subject to a heavier taxation (0.261) or are at the earlier stages of convergence towards the steady-state equilibrium (-0.122). Conversely, the dynamics of R&D difficulty turns out to be unrelated to each of these factors. Moreover, it should be noticed that the effect of additional regressors is not always consistent with the VE framework; indeed, in this type of DTO set-up, both profitability and convergence towards the steady state are found to explain differentials in innovation rates across sectors. (5) we present estimates of the R&D technology designed by Li (2003) . In regression (1), all the estimated parameters are statistically significant and consistent with the theory; the only exception is the quality of the state-of-the-art product (q), being unrelated to the rate of innovation (ι). The probability of introducing a patentable invention is raised by the across-industry quality spillover and the level of R&D input, Q and (0.077 and 0.212 respectively). As in Table (4), the difficulty of innovating, defined by the intensity of R&D expenses, is found to reduce the rate at which an innovation is generated (-0.300). The latter variable in turn speeds up the pace at which R&D difficulty grows over time (1.296) . Finally, the quality-adjusted rate of innovation, i · q, has a positive and statistically significant impact on the dynamics of the stateof-the-art quality (2.255); this effect is strong enough to stimulate significant quality improvements over time (∆q > 0), as witnessed by the rejection of the hypothesis that parameter γ 1 (or equivalently ζ) is equal to one (Wald test p-value=0.00).
The variant of Li's innovation function described by eqs. (18)- (20) is then evaluated by considering the two alternative obsolescence rates for patent stocks (cols. 2 and 3). If relatively slow obsolescence is assumed (7%), the dynamics of research difficulty turns out to be unrelated to patenting. By contrast, when a rate of 30% is imposed, there is no evidence of quality growth in the state-of-the-art products (Wald test p-value for γ 1 equal to one=0.21); this might explain the absence of evidence of the cross-industry quality externality in the first equation. As a further check for regression (1), we use R&D expenses per patent count as an alternative measure of research difficulty. In column (4), the detrimental effect of R&D difficulty, x, on the rate of innovation, ι, is definitively lower (-0.178). On the other hand, the patenting rate has a slightly stronger impact on the change in R&D difficulty (1.656), but the parameter still lies at the border of significance. Another limitation of this regression is that the average quality of stateof-the-art products, Q, loses significance in explaining the probability of winning an R&D race.
As an alternative to forward citations backward, citations and claims are used as patent quality indicators in regressions (5) and (6). These variables behave as inverse measures of the innovation content of state-of-the-art products, as indicating the presence of a negative externality among sectors. It may reflect the fact that most backward citations are inserted by examiners at USPTO, 16 and that claims are artificially added by the applicant to extend the breadth of legal protection as much as possible. When we use the common quality factor extracted from forward citations, backward citations and claims (col. 7), quality variables never reach a conventional level of significance, probably because of a relatively low power of instruments; in this case Li's technology collapses into that devised by Segerstrom.
It is worth pointing out implications of robustness checks reported on the righthand side of Table ( 5) . Most control variables play a role in the generation of new ideas (first equation), but they do not influence the dynamics of the forces underlying innovation processes, i.e. growth in R&D difficulty and product quality (second and third equation). These findings are not due to misspecification of the model, as they remain unchanged even when we introduce control variables expressed in logs or first differences. The absence of correlation between quality jumps and control variables appears reasonable in the light of the erratic evolution in product quality. Instead, the result for R&D difficulty closely follows Ngai and Samaniego (2010) . Using US industry data, these authors calibrate a model where R&D intensity is assumed to depend on technological opportunities, appropriability and diminishing returns to R&D; they find that the latter factor completely explains industry differentials in research intensity. Looking at the determinants of patenting rate, it is interesting to observe that the across-industry quality spillover, Q, disappears when international knowledge flows are allowed for (col. 10). Following Luintel and Khan (2004) , it may signal that technology transfers from the US mainly transit through dissemination of knowledge embodied in state-of-the-art products; in this sense, the coefficient of Q found in previous estimates might measure potential spillovers captured by foreign competitors.
Rent protection activities (RPA)
As a conclusive step of the work, we estimate the R&D technology featured by rent protection activities in the version proposed by Sener (2008) . As described in section (3), the lack of an appropriate measure of RPA leads us to follow an indirect strategy of identification. In column (1), RPA are assumed to be inversely related to the acrossindustry dispersion of the received cites (ϕ = 1, ς = 0). In this case, the effect of the variables identified by the theory as determinants of the rate of patenting is largely confirmed (0.140 for employment and -0.252 for research difficulty), as well as the role of the latter variable on the change in R&D difficulty (1.418) . There is also evidence that the difficulty of innovating grows faster in technologically concentrated industries (0.300). Nevertheless, this inference has to be taken with extreme caution as instruments are not sufficiently informative (Sargan-Hansen p-value=0.02). Conversely, growth in research difficulty induced by RPA is not statistically significant when lobbying efforts are approximated by technological closeness (col. 2; ϕ = 0, ς = 1). However, when an interactive effect between technological concentration and technological closeness is allowed for, it emerges that both the mechanisms elaborated by the Schumpeterian growth theory (DTO and RPA) may be behind the rise in research complexity (column 3; ϕ = ς = 1). In terms of parameter size, the joint effect of RPA is found to fall between those yielded by using indirect indicators one at a time: ceteris paribus, a 1% increase in the lobbying activity raises research difficulty by over 0.016% (significant at a 10% level), and this reverberates through a lowering of patenting in the industry (-0.257). The impact of RPA remains stable across the specifications using the alternative rates of obsolescence for patented ideas (cols. 4 and 5). As in Segestrom's technology, resorting to R&D expenses per patent as an empirical counterpart for R&D difficulty does not provide useful insights, as changes in this indicator cannot be predicted with the employed set of explanatory variables (col. 6). With regard to the forces driving the rate of patenting, the estimated coefficients are perfectly consistent with those found in the baseline DTO framework (see Table 4 ). Table 6 about here Inference on the detrimental effect of RPA for modern processes of innovation is partially supported by regressions including control variables. The interaction effect between technological concentration and technological contiguity is stronger and more significant when we consider the distance to innovation frontier (col. 7). The reverse occurs when profit rates are included into the specification: a larger profitability is associated with a higher probability to innovate and, consequently, to take over industry leadership; this makes difficult discerning the effect of the control variable from RPA, being the latter gauged by technological market concentration (and product contiguity). Finally, attention has to be paid to the role played by financial factors. Throughout the paper, financial development is not found to affect patenting, nor changes in productivity, research difficulty and product quality. It may occur as we look at cross-industry variation of data within the US; conversely, the majority of works use cross-industry, cross-country data where a large portion of variance is explained by international differentials in access to credit, the degree of external financial dependence, etc. (Ang, 2010) . In such studies, financial development is found to contribute to innovation directly, but also indirectly by orienting funds towards innovative entrants and away from incumbents (Samaniego, 2010) .
Concluding remarks
This paper has explored the soundness of the R&D technologies designed by the most recent Schumpeterian models of endogenous growth. The aim was to understand whether these models have solid foundations and can be used as guidelines for tailoring growth-oriented policies of innovation. The present work integrates the empirical literature inspired by the second-generation Schumpeterian growth theory, for which fully endogenous growth models replicate macroeconomic data better. Our evidence indicates that most characteristics of the R&D technologies designed by new endogenous growth theories are empirically grounded. However, the R&D race based on the mechanism introduced by Segerstrom, 1998 of diminishing technological opportunities fits US innovation statistics better, even when the change in state-of-the-art product quality is allowed for (Li, 2003) . This effect is also found to interplay with barriers erected by incumbents to prevent the R&D competition of challengers, in the form described by Sener (2008) . With regard to the R&D framework based on variety expansion of Aghion and Howitt (1998) , corroborative evidence is obtained for an innovation framework where patentable knowledge becomes obsolete quite rapidly; mainly due to the increasing internationalization of knowledge, this scenario does not appear completely unrealistic, as the elapse of time during which research efforts are able to fuel own competitive advantage becomes progressively shorter.
In the light of such results, the main result of the literature that semi-endogenous scale-invariant growth models are empirically flawed should be reconsidered. Our con-clusion should clearly be taken with the usual caution imposed by data limitation (industry disaggregation, time coverage, lobbying indicators, etc.). The legitimacy of the various forms of R&D technology will have to be re-examined in the near future by exploiting more adequate data and by considering the most recent years, when the global explosion of R&D and patenting activities triggered the take-off of knowledge economy. Nonetheless, we believe that the piece of evidence provided by this paper is a valuable starting point. 
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(2) The rate of patenting of industry i is defined as the ratio between counts of patent applications at year t (wit), and the cumulative value of counts up to that year (kit). kit is built through the perpetual inventory method and geometrical depreciation from series on patent counts. The rate of depreciation, δ, is assumed to be constant among sectors and over time; it is set at 15% in baseline regressions, while rates of 7 and 30% are used in robustness checks. The initial value ki0 is computed by means of Hall and Mairesse (1995) 's formula:
where wi0 is the amount of patent counts at 1973, gi the average annual rate of change of wit between 1973 and 1996. The number of patent counts is corrected for the truncation due to the time lag existing between the application date and the grant date (on average, 1 year and 11 months in our sample). This lag leads the number of observed applications to be underestimated for the period before 1975 (i.e., the first available granting year for cited/citing patents) with respect to the true distribution of applications. During the 1970s, the probability for an application to be accepted within one year from the application date was of 25%, within two years of 77%, and 89% within three. After four years, the granting process came to an end for 95% applications, implying that a patent applied in 1970 was highly probable to be issued by 1975. Following Hall et al. (2005) , the applications before 1975, wit, are corrected with a factor defined by the inverse of cumulative probabilities of the application-grant time lag (P rs), calculated on the overall sample: cfs = ( 2 s=1 P r1975−s) −1 , s = 1, ..., 2. The correction factor is slightly higher than 1 for patents applied in 1974, whereas amounts to 1.5 for those of 1973. For these years, adjusted patent counts are given by wit = cft * wit. Based on the application year, patents are assigned to twelve manufacturing industries according to their first SIC code reported in the NBER USPTO data set. The SIC classification is also used to consistently aggregate data on R&D employment, R&D expenses and control variables.
The intensity of R&D expenditure is defined by total funds devoted to research activities over gross output, both taken at current prices. Total R&D expenditure is the sum of federally-and privately-funded research expenses. It is important to remark that NSF does not disclose publicly-funded R&D resources for the entire time-span, as it does for privately-financed R&D expenses. Hence, missing values are calculated by first interpolating the ratio between total and privately-funded R&D expenses and, then, applying the resulting mark-up to the private research expenditure. As an alternative indicator of R&D difficulty, we also use the ratio between R&D expenses and patent counts, which also consists in the inverse measure of research productivity. R&D expenses are converted into 1995 constant dollars by applying industry deflators for gross output to current prices expenditure.
The number of full-time equivalent R&D scientists and engineers (S&E) is utilized as a measure of R&D employment. Due to some missing values, these series are completed by following a two-step procedure similar to that adopted for R&D expenditure. For missing years, we first interpolate the share of S&E on total employment of firms undertaking R&D activities; we then apply the interpolated shares to the total employment of R&D-performing firms.
Data on technology index are available for detailed 21 manufacturing sectors for the period 1973-1996 . They are aggregated up to twelve industries, and then to total manufacturing, using the Divisia-Tornqvist index formula based on Domar weights, i.e., the current prices ratio between industry gross output and aggregate value added (respectively indicated with GOit and V At):
where sit is a two-year average of the GOit/V At ratio. At and ait are then indexed to 100 in 1995. In the light of the number index nature of this variable, the economy-wide level of leading-edge technology is defined as deviation of the maximum value of the industry technology index from the aggregate (manufacturing) value. The contribution of technologically advanced industries to the dynamics of manufacturing technology index is constantly increasing, as sit is relatively stable over time with respect to technology growth, ∆ ln ait (see the discussion in Venturini, 2007) ; this ensures that the largest deviation between sectoral and aggregate (manufacturing) levels of the technology index is a good proxy for the relative production frontier.
As a quality measure of state-of-the-art products, for each industry we consider the maximum number of forward citations, backward citations or claimed shown by a patent, qj . It is well known that the most recently applied patents are affected by citation truncation: the volume of their cites reduces with approaching the end of the period under examination (the year 1996), as the time window to be cited is shorter than for older applications. This aspect is controlled for by applying the quasi fixed-effect correction proposed by Hall et al. (2001) . We scale the citations received by any individual patent (one million and over observations) on the yearly citation mean of reference industry (year/sector-effect correction). This type of correction removes the annual effect of truncation which is specific to each sector. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) point out that the above reported quality indicators are likely to convey different pieces of information about the true value of patent quality. As a consequence, by assuming qj to be a latent factor common among such observable features, the process underlying the quality endowment of each patent can be formulated as a multiple-indicator model:
y kj is the log-value of the k indicator (adjusted forward citations, backward citations and claims) concerned with the jth patent. y kj is hypothesized to be determined by some observable (exogenous) features, Xj , and by the latent common factor, qj . Such a quality variable is assumed to be distributed as a standard normal; λ is the loading factor denoting the degree of correlation existing among the different observable indicators. e kj is a well-behaving error term that is typically associated with this process; µ k is a constant term. The key assumption of the multiple-indicator model is that the variability of each observable quality measure is generated by the common factor and the residual disturbance. qj is estimated on the overall sample of individual applications through the two-step procedure proposed by Hall et al. (2007) . Firstly, we build a system where each observable indicator of patent quality is regressed on the two (observable) exogenous characteristics (application year and IPC technological sub-class of the patent), and a constant term:
Secondly, the common quality factor is extracted from the residuals of such auxiliary regressions (so-called first-step residuals) by means of the method of maximum likelihood:
The score assigned to each patent is treated as a proxy for qj ; the quality level of the state-of-the-art products is defined as the highest score assigned any year to a patent in each sector.
As an indirect measure of rent protection, we compute a normalized Herfindahl-Hirsh index of forward citations, where the total cites received by a patent j in the sector i, Nji, are distinguished by the origin of citing industries, s (time subscripts omitted):
In the regression analysis, we use the industry average of the patent concentration index: hi = J j=1 HIji/J, where J is the total number of patents counted in each sector. As an indicator of technological closeness (or contiguity), we take the inverse of the quality jump between the two most frequently cited patents, 1/∆q, using data on adjusted forward citations.
The control variables are constructed as follows:
Distance to frontier: Ratio between industry-level and and the maximum sample value of research productivity. For each year, a TFP-type index of research productivity is calculated as the ratio between innovation output (patent counts) and innovation input (research expenses at constant prices). In the TFP growth equation of the VE framework, distance to productivity frontier is used.
Trade openness: Sum of industry imports and exports over gross output (in current prices). Trade data are taken from OECD Bilateral Trade 1998.
International technology spillovers: Imports-weighted R&D capital of the OECD partner industries (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and UK, hereafter denoted by f , f = 1, ..., F ). The weighting scheme follows Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe (1998) : 1973, ..., 1996. RDS if t is the R&D stock of sector i at time t in country f , mx if t the export flow of this industry towards the US, and y if t is gross output of the exporting industry; mx and y are expressed at current prices. For each partner country, R&D capital is built with the perpetual inventory method described above (δ = 0.15), from R&D expenditure series expressed at US PPP of 1995 (source: OECD Anberd database, 2002 and 2009).
Profitability: Current prices ratio between profits and gross output. We consider corporate profits before tax without inventory valuation adjustment and capital consumption adjustment, extracted from BEA Historical series on GDP-by-Industry. Due to the presence of some negative values (losses), profit rate has been scaled on the minimum value.
Taxation: Taxes on production and imports over gross output, at current prices (source: BEA Historical series on GDP-by-Industry). 
